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ADEQUATE (NON)PROVOCATION AND HEAT OF PASSION
AS EXCUSE NOT JUSTIFICATION
Reid Griffith Fontaine*
For a number of reasons, including the complicated psychological makeup of reac-
tive homicide, the heat of passion defense has remained subject to various points of
confusion. One persistent issue of disagreement has been the justificatory versus
excusatory nature of the defense. In this Article, I highlight and categorize a series
of varied American homicide cases in which the applicability of heat of passion
was supported although adequate provocation (or significant provocation by the
victim) was absent. The cases are organized to illustrate how common law heat of
passion may apply in instances in which there is no actual provocation or the
source of provocation is the victim. The rationale is that the emotional disturbance
that interferes with one's rationality and self-control arises as an effect of the genu-
ine belief that one has been seriously wronged, a perspective that can only be
characterized as an excuse. In addition, I discuss how the rationale that this de-
fense is a partial justification fails even in most situations in which the killer has
really been seriously provoked by the victim. Finally, I clarify discrete psychological
components of heat of passion homicide, and discuss how scholarly and judicial
blurring of these forms of mental functioning may contribute to the longstanding
confusion as to the nature of the defense. In sum, this Article contributes further
evidence as to why it is correct to view heat of passion as a partial excuse.
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INTRODUCTION
The heat of passion (or provocation) doctrine continues to be a
topic of lively debate throughout Anglo-American criminal law.
The very nature of the doctrine has remained unresolved-judges,
lawmakers, and academics alike have struggled to properly gauge
the doctrine's spirit, as well as the boundaries of its application.
Among the many convoluted issues surrounding heat of passion,
the debate as to whether the defense is one of partial justification
or excuse 2 has been persistent.
The complete list of reasons why discussion of this issue has re-
mained murky is long, though a few critical factors immediately
come to mind. Fundamental to the confusion is the longstanding
philosophical disagreement about the respective conceptual
boundaries of justification and excuse, and how such boundaries
may be determined. In addition, certain sociopolitical interests
may have an interest in framing heat of passion as a partial justifi-
cation.3 Finally, another source of misconception is the muddling
of the related but differentiable roles of cognition, emotion, and
behavior in heat of passion homicide.
In the United States, the Model Penal Code (MPC) has taken an
obvious stand with its "extreme mental or emotional disturbance"
language, largely read to clearly frame heat of passion as an ex-
cuse.4 However, numerous states have not adopted the MPC's
language, and there remains a divide among them as to their un-
derstanding of the nature of the defense and where and when it
applies.6 The persistence of this divide suggests that additional
1. The terms "heat of passion" and "provocation" are used synonymously throughout
this Article when making reference to the partial defense.
2. Any reference to the heat of passion defense as ajustification or excuse should be
understood to mean partialjustification or excuse in that the defense does not completely
exonerate the defendant, but serves to reduce murder to manslaughter.
3. For instance, it may be favorable to treat heat of passion as a partial justification
defense in an effort to see that adultery or romantic betrayal, see Susan D. Rozelle, Controlling
Passion: Adultery and the Provocation Defense, 37 RUTGERS L. REv. 197 (2005), or homosexual
advances, see Robert B. Mison, Comment, Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Homosexual Ad-
vance as Insufficient Provocation, 80 CAL. L. REv. 133 (1992), be deemed inadequate
provocation. This is not to say that there is no merit in analyses that place into question the
adequacy of these (and other) examples of provocation, but rather that an interest in deem-
ing them inadequate does not, and cannot, make the heat of passion defense one of partial
justification, though these authors treat the defense as such.
4. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1980); MARKUS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW:
MODEL PENAL CODE § 16 (2002).
5. Victoria F. Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense,
106 YALE LJ. 1331, 1340 n.52 (1997).
6. See Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L.
REv. 591, 636-37 (1981); see also Nourse, supra note 5, at 1340 n.53.
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analysis is required for American jurisdictions to come to some
agreement as to whether the defense is one of justification or ex-
cuse.
In this Article, I provide further analytical evidence in favor of
an understanding that places the traditional common law framing
of heat of passion squarely in the excuse camp.7 First, I provide a
hierarchical categorization of heat of passion cases in which no
real provocation by the victim exists (called "adequate non-
provocation" cases) in order to (a) show the potential structural
boundaries of heat of passion as a partial excuse defense, and (b)
illustrate how a specific, previously unrecognized type of heat of
passion killer who is cognitively biased may be similarly protected.
This taxonomy is presented in order to show how, under common
law, the heat of passion defense may be extended to apply to cases
in which "adequate provocation" in the traditional sense of the
term does not exist. Second, I introduce several novel considera-
tions as to why heat of passion, from an analytical perspective, is
accurately understood as an excuse and not a justification. In-
cluded among these considerations is an analysis of psychological
components of heat of passion homicide and how treating these
components as discrete areas of psychological functioning may
clarify the excusing nature of the defense.
I. COGNITIVE DYSFUNCTION AND THE TRADITIONAL STANDARDS FOR
ADEQUATE PROVOCATION
A majority of United States jurisdictions recognize, in some
form, heat of passion as an affirmative, partial defense to murder
by which a defendant, if he successfully satisfies the defense's crite-
ria, is convicted of the lesser crime of manslaughter. The criteria
for heat of passion vary by jurisdiction (both among and between
common law jurisdictions and jurisdictions that have adopted the
Model Penal Code's "extreme mental or emotional disturbance"
language"). However, the defense is typically structured among
common law jurisdictions such that the defendant must demon-
strate that (a) he was adequately provoked, (b) as a direct result of
7. Because the nature of various debates about heat of passion differs considerably
across Anglo-American jurisdictions, the present discussion focuses on United States crimi-
nal law. Also, it should be noted at the outset that this Article is in no way intended as a
comprehensive review of arguments as to whether heat of passion is ajustification or excuse,
a clarification that I reinforce below. See infra note 10.
8. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1) (b) (1980); see also Nourse, supra note 5, at 1340
n.52.
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said provocation, he became emotionally charged such that he lost
self-control, (c) not enough time to "cool off' passed between
provocation and killing, and (d) he did not, in fact, cool off prior
to killing his victim (s).9 Adequate provocation is considered to mean
provocation by the victim that would be sufficient to significantly
undermine the rationality of a reasonable person.
Because, in part, I find myself among American criminal law
theorists who are comfortable with (or, rather, resigned to) the
understanding that the doctrine is definitively one of excuse,'0 I
now seek to move past this fundamental issue and onto more con-
temporary issues of heat of passion that have remained largely
neglected. Those issues include how the structural framing of the
heat of passion doctrine, as well as its application to individual de-
fendants, may be informed by empirical research in psychology
and other behavioral sciences. Elsewhere I have written about em-
pirically substantiated psychological-or, more specifically, social
cognitive-processes that may (and I argue should) be considered
in the conceptualization and application of heat of passion (here-
after called the social cognitive argument)."
Before moving further, it should prove helpful to succinctly re-
state the social cognitive argument to illustrate the necessity of
returning to the justification/excuse debate about heat of passion.
In psychology, there is considerable empirical literature that dem-
onstrates that aggressive (or violent) individuals are biased in favor
of interpreting ambiguous provocations as definitively intentional,
hostile, and provocative.' 2 Specifically, in situations that are open to
9. Cf J. R. AVERILL, ANGER AND AGGRESSION: AN ESSAY ON EMOTION (1982); Marcia
Baron, Killing in the Heat of Passion, in SETTING THE MORAL COMPASS: ESSAYS BY WOMEN
PHILOSOPHERS 353-78 (Cheshire Calhoun ed., 2004); WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W.
SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed. 1986).
10. Joshua Dressler has been among the most reliable of such scholars. See Joshua
Dressier, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?: Some Reflections on a Difficult Subject, 86 MINN. L.
REV. 959 (2002) [hereinafter Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?]; Joshua Dressier,
When "Heterosexual" Men Kill "Homosexual" Men: Reflections on Provocation Law, Sexual Advances,
and the "Reasonable Man" Standard, 85J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 726 (1995) [hereinafter
Dressier, When "Heterosexual" Men Kill "Homosexual" Men]; Joshua Dressier, Provocation: Partial
Justification or PartialExcuse?, 51 MOD. L. REv. 467 (1988) [hereinafter Dressier, Provocation];
Joshua Dressier, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 421 (1982) [hereinafter Dressier, Rethinking Heat of Passion].
11. Reid Griffith Fontaine, The Wrongfulness of Wrongly Interpreting Wrongfulness: Provoca-
tion, Interpretational Bias, and Heat of Passion Homicide, 12 NEW CRi,5. L. REV. 69 (2009)
[hereinafter Fontaine, Wrongfulness]; Reid Griffith Fontaine, Reactive Cognition, Reactive Emo-
tion: Toward a More Psychologically-Informed Understanding of Reactive Homicide, 14 PSYcHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 243 (2008) [hereinafter Fontaine, Reactive Cognition].
12. There is an abundance of scientific studies that have empirically supported this as-
sociation, particularly with respect to aggressive youths. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Dodge,John E.
Bates & Gregory S. Pettit, Mechanisms in the Cycle of Violence, 250 Sc. 1678 (1990); Kenneth A.
[VOL. 43:1
Adequate (Non)Provocation and Heat of Passion
being interpreted as benign or provocative as to the wrongfulness
of the stimulus actor, violent individuals are significantly more
likely to interpret them as provocative (hereafter called provocation
interpretational bias). This empirical finding has been replicated
across numerous social laboratories and with varied populations.
More specifically, provocation interpretational bias has been
uniquely linked with a subtype of violence typically referred to as
"reactive violence."' 3 As compared to instrumental violence, which
tends to be self-initiated, premeditated, motivated by personal gain
(e.g., attaining power, money), and relatively non-emotional, reac-
tive violence is exemplified by a "heated" emotional retaliation that
is enacted in response to a situation that is perceived to be wrong-
ful or threatening. Thus reactive violence is normally engaged out
of anger toward a perceived provoker (e.g., heat of passion) or fear
of a perceived threat (e.g., self-defense). 4
In its most serious form, provocation interpretational bias may
be functionally limiting such that the reactive aggressor is able only
to "read" the ambiguously provocative situation at hand as one that
is seriously wrongful or otherwise offensive. For example, the fa-
ther who was abused in his youth may immediately and definitively
interpret a situation in which his child has been harmed as one in
which the harm was caused intentionally by a third party. This is
despite the real possibilities that the harm (a) may have been in-
flicted accidentally by a third party, (b) was not even caused by
another person, but rather was due to the child's carelessness, loss
of balance, or other unfortunate circumstance, or (c) was self-
inflicted by the child.
It is unlikely, though, that an interpretation of serious provoca-
tion that stems from an interpretational bias would meet the
typical standard of adequate provocation. A stimulus that is am-
biguous as to whether it is seriously provocative is, all other things
being equal, unlikely to be deemed sufficiently provocative (in that
it is not necessarily provocative at all) by an ordinary or reasonable
person. Rather, the reasonable person, who by definition is not
Dodge & Joseph P. Newman, Hostile Attributional Biases in Severely Aggressive Adolescents, 99 J.
ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 385 (1990). Also, there is a recent meta-analysis of empirical findings
that link provocation interpretational bias to aggressive behavior. Bram Orobio de Castro et
al., Hostile Attribution of Intent and Aggressive Behavior: A Meta-Analysis, 73 CHILD DEV. 916
(2002).
13. See, e.g., Nicki R. Crick & Kenneth A. Dodge, Social Information-Processing Mechanisms
in Reactive and Proactive Aggression, 67 CHILD DEV. 993 (1996); Kenneth A. Dodge et al., Reac-
tive and Proactive Aggression in School Children and Psychiatrically Impaired Chronically Assaultive
Youth, 106J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 37 (1997); Dodge & Newman, supra note 12.
14. See Reid Griffith Fontaine, Disentangling the Psychology and Law of Instrumental and
Reactive Subtypes of Aggression, 13 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 143 (2007).
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cognitively biased or dysfunctional, may consider alternative inter-
pretations of the stimulus, or, prior to reacting, investigate the
situation further so that he may have sufficient information to con-
fidently and more accurately interpret its nature. However, in a
case where the cognitively-biased heat of passion killer (a) did not
cause his cognitive bias, and (b) could not have reasonably fore-
seen how said bias would contribute to his reactive killing, it is
unclear how he is any more culpable than the heat of passion de-
fendant who killed in response to a provocative situation that does
meet the reasonable person standard. This is the crux of the social
cognitive argument.
Of course, the social cognitive argument presumes that heat of
passion is a partial excuse defense. If heat of passion were a partial
justification defense, then the argument would be moot. Essential
to the conceptualization of heat of passion as a partial justification
is that the killer must have been seriously wronged-there pre-
sumably must be adequate, real provocation in order to even
attempt an argument that a reactive killing is at all justifiable.' 5 Of
important note, though, is that whereas provocation typically needs
to be adequate (meaning that it must meet the reasonable person
standard), it does not have to be real.
II. To WHAT DEGREE IS PROVOCATION LAW ABOUT PROVOCATION?
In his influential 2002 article, Joshua Dressler stated "Provoca-
tion law is all about emotions, most notably anger."' However,
provocation law is not all about emotions, per se, but rather is, at
least to some extent, about provocation. 7 But what did Dressler
mean by this assertion? 8 Below is a brief analysis of the respective
degrees to which provocation law is about (or concerned with)
provocation versus emotion, which may inform a proper determi-
nation as to the justificatory versus excusatory nature of heat of
passion.
It is outside the scope of this Article to discuss all arguments as
to whether heat of passion is a partial justification or excuse. In-
15. Below, I argue that even most instances of egregious, realprovocation fail to justify,
even partially, a reactive killing. See infra Part IV.
16. Dressier, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?, supra note 10, at 959 n.5.
17. Fontaine, supra note 14, at 150.
18. I believe that the meta-message of Professor Dressler's statement is right on
point-the key component of heat of passion is emotion. Only via heightened emotional
arousal are the killer's rational capacity and self-control undermined, and, therefore, culpa-
bility is mitigated.
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deed, it is unnecessary to do so, as others have taken on this task
elsewhere. 9 Presumably, for the doctrine to be one of partial justi-
fication, it would demand a higher standard than that of excuse,
for it would mean that the action of the killer is a partially morally
good or right (or at least partially acceptable) thing to do. ° Cer-
tainly, the only component of heat of passion that could be argued
to partially justify or entitle21 one to kill another is that the killer was
first wrongfully and substantially harmed by the victim. In heat of
passion terms, this is the "criterion" of adequate provocation. As
previously stated, American common law has been inconsistent in
22its treatment of the doctrine as one of justification or excuse.
Similarly, common law jurisdictions have varied considerably in
their determinations as to what does and does not count as ade-
quate provocation-so much so that I have carefully placed the
word criterion in quotation marks, as adequate provocation itself is a
standard of questionable meaning. In fact, analysis of American
common law reveals that, across various types of reactive homi-
cides, provocation by the victim is not at all necessary in order for
the heat of passion defense to be recognized by the court. A taxo-
nomic review of the more illustrative cases follows below.
A. Adequate Non-Provocation Found in Provocation Doctrine
There have been multiple cases in which, although no actual
provocation by the victim is present, the court has recognized the
applicability (or at least invokability) of the heat of passion de-
fense. If adequate provocation is defined as provocation by the victim
sufficient to significantly undermine the rationality of a reasonable person,
then we may term these cases ones of "adequate non-provocation,"
19. Among them, Dressler's is most widely recognized. See Dressier, Provocation, supra
note 10, at 467-80. Although, much has been written related to the topic by Dressler and
others in the last twenty years.
20. See, e.g., J. L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, 57 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN Soc'Y 1, 3 (1956-
57), reprinted inJUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE IN THE CRIMINAL LAW: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS
3, 4-5 (Michael L. Corrado ed., 1994); JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW
§§ 16.03-04 (3d ed. 2001).
21. See Austin, supra note 20, at 5.
22. There are even cases that consider the doctrine as either. See, e.g., People v. Wick-
ersham, 650 P.2d 311, 321 (Cal. 1982) ("[Hieat of passion must be such a passion as would
naturally be aroused in the mind of an ordinarily reasonable person tinder the given facts
and circumstances, and ... , consequently, no defendant may set up his own standard of
conduct and justify or excuse himself because in fact his passions were aroused, unless further
the jury believe that the facts and circumstances were sufficient to arouse the passions of the
ordinarily reasonable man . (quoting People v. Valentine, 169 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1946)))
(emphasis added).
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in that the adequate provocation standard is met but real provoca-
tion by the victim is absent. Adequate non-provocation cases may
be organized into two categories (Mistaken Belief and External
Source Provocation), each of which being further specified by two
subtypes.
1. Category 1: Mistaken Belief
The first category is defined not by the absence of provocation
by the victim altogether, but rather a mistaken belief as to the exis-
tence of a serious provocation by the victim. This category reflects
the ability and inclination of courts to recognize the spirit of mis-
take of fact doctrine 3 as a part of heat of passion. As discussed
below, this approach has been judicially supported in several
American homicide cases, and has been reflected by statutory lan-
guage in various instances, as well. In particular, the MPC's
expression of heat of passion specifically makes this allowance in
explaining its "extreme mental or emotional disturbance" lan-
guage as requiring a "reasonable explanation or excuse" by which
reasonableness is "determined from the viewpoint of a person in
the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes them to
be.",
24
a. Sub-Type: Reasonable Mistake
The first subtype of Category 1 includes instances in which there
is a reasonable mistake as to provocation by the victim. Within this
subtype, there exists perhaps no more influential opinion than that
offered by the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut at the turn
of the twentieth century in State v. Yanz.25 In Yanz, the defendant
came upon his wife in the intimate company of a male acquaint-
ance in the woods, the latter of whom was known by the defendant,
as well. The nature of the intimacy of the rendezvous was disputed,
and there remained an unanswered question as to whether the de-
fendant's wife and her companion were indeed engaged in sexual
23. Mistake of fact constitutes a defense when the defendant's mistake negatives the
requisite mens rea of the alleged crime. Note, though, that whereas some states require that
the defendant's mistake of fact must be objectively reasonable, many, in fact, do not. See
MATTHEW LIPPMAN, CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL LAW: CONCEPTS, CASES, AND CONTROVER-
siEs 316-17 (2007).
24. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1) (b) (1980) (emphasis added).
25. 50 A. 37 (Conn. 1901).
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relations. The defendant, though, having interpreted that his wife
had romantically betrayed him, fired upon the male acquaintance,
killing him. In the majority opinion, the court in Yanz wrote:
The law justifies a jury in calling it manslaughter when, on
finding his wife in the act of adultery, a man, in the first
transport of passion, kills her paramour. This is because from
a sudden act of this kind, committed under the natural ex-
citement of feeling induced by so gross an outrage, malice,
which is a necessary ingredient of the crime of murder, can-
not fairly be implied. The excitement is the effect of a belief, from
ocular evidence, of the actual commission of adultery. It is the belief,
so reasonably formed, that excites the uncontrollable passion. Such a
belief, though a mistaken one, is calculated to induce the same emo-
tions as would beftlt were the wrongful act in fact committed.26
In essence, the court in Yanz reasoned that where there is a rea-
sonable belief of being seriously provoked, whether accurate or
mistaken, a person may experience the same level of arousal such
that she is equally likely to become emotionally uncontrolled. The
reasonable interpretation of significant provocation, then, gives
rise to the defendant's heated killing, partially excusing the defen-
dant's crime and reducing it from murder to manslaughter. Here,
adequate provocation amounts to the reasonable belief that there
existed serious aggravation, even in the case that the belief is, in
fact, invalid.
Although Yanz is more than a century old, it is still actively
cited,27 reaffirming a reading of the doctrine that it is the reason-
able, even if erroneous, belief that the victim was the source of
serious provocation that is sufficient to satisfy the adequate provo-
cation standard. In one recent case, Howell v. State,' s the defendant
killed his victim after the victim made statements that were inter-
preted by the defendant to link the victim to a third man, an
alleged drug dealer, who had threatened and shot at the defendant
26. Id. at 39 (emphasis added).
27. E.g., Howell v. State, 917 P.2d 1202, 1209 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996); People v. Marti-
nez, No. B152518, 2002 WL 1482547, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. July 11, 2002); People v. Brooks,
230 Cal. Rptr. 86, 89 (Ct. App. 1986); State v. Montanez, 894 A.2d 928, 939 (Conn. 2006);
State v. Chicano, 584 A.2d 425, 430 n.12 (Conn. 1990); cf. People v. Contreras, No. F048014,
2006 WL 2942524, at *23 & n.24 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2006) (highlighting a difference in
fact patterns).
28. 917 P.2d at 1205. In addition to Yanz, the court of appeals in Howell also cited State
v. Michae4 82 S.E. 611, 614 (W. Va. 1914) (finding that if the defendant reasonably believed
that the person standing next to the provoker was acting in concert with the provoker, a
finding of manslaughter, and not murder, is correct). Howell, 917 P.2d at 1209.
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earlier in the day. The court of appeals reversed Howell's murder
conviction on the grounds that his belief that the victim was a
"friend" of the alleged drug dealer may have been reasonable, even
if incorrect, and thus the court should have instructed the jury on
heat of passion. In further support of the reversal, the court of ap-
peals cited Alaska statutory law, 9 which, consistent with Yanz,
provides that a defendant on trial for murder may have her crime
mitigated to manslaughter when a reasonable person in the defen-
dant's circumstances would have believed that the victim had acted
toward her in a seriously provocative manner.30 That is, as long as
the belief of serious provocation is a reasonable one, its validity is
not required. In the case that the reasonable belief is incorrect, the
killer's conduct may still be partially excused. The belief itself
serves as adequate non-provocation.
b. Sub-Type: Unreasonable Mistake
Alternatively, the second subtype in Category 1 includes in-
stances in which the killer's belief that he has been provoked is
presumably unreasonable.31 In Howell, there was some question as
to whether the defendant's mistake as to the provoker was due, in
part, to his intoxication, an issue that was disputed. Presumably
because the degree, if any, of the defendant's intoxication was un-
known, it did not play a role in the court of appeals' decision to
reverse. Intoxication of the defendant in State v. Mauricio, however,
was undisputed.32 In Mauricio, the defendant, while intoxicated,
killed his victim upon mistaking him for the bouncer with whom
he had had conflict earlier in the night.3 On appeal, despite hav-
29. Id. at 1208-09 (citing ALASKA CRIMINAL CODE REVISION, Part I, at 30 (Tent. Draft
1977)); ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.115(a), 11.41.115(0 (2) (1978). The current language of the
statute leaves no question as to the correctness of the court of appeals' understanding of the
legislature's intention: "'serious provocation' means conduct which is sufficient to excite an
intense passion in a reasonable person in the defendant's situation .... , under the circum-
stances as the defendant reasonably believed them to be." ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.115(f)(2)
(1988).
30. 917 P.2d at 1208.
31. Note that the social cognitive argument falls under this category of Class 1. Due to
the cognitive dysfunction-or, more specifically, provocation interpretational bias--of the
defendant, he may mistakenly and unreasonably (by definition) interpret the ambiguous
provocation as substantially provocative and egregious. See Fontaine, Wrongfulness, supra note
11, at 72-79.
32. 568 A.2d 879, 881 (NJ. 1990). Not only did eyewitnesses agree that the defendant
was intoxicated, but the defendant himself requested that the superior court judge instruct
the jury as to the intoxication defense. The judge denied this request and the defendant
raised the denial on appeal. Id. at 887.
33. Id. at 882.
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ing recognized that the defendant was mistaken as to the provoker,
and that the defendant was undisputedly intoxicated at the time of
his mistake, the Supreme Court of New Jersey found that the supe-
rior court erred in its failure to instruct the jury as to the heat of
passion defense.34 Of course, a mistake, by definition, cannot be
presumed reasonable if made when the maker is intoxicated. On
the contrary, some courts have asserted that a non-sober judgment
of provocation is necessarily inconsistent with reasonableness.
The supreme court's reversal in Mauricio, then, effectively recog-
nized that a presumably unreasonable (due to intoxication)
mistake as to provocation by the victim may be considered when
determining adequate provocation in heat of passion. 6 Whereas
Mauricio and the other Category 1 cases herein discussed are rela-
tively infrequent, they do not reflect an exhaustive list of this
interpretation of heat of passion. Of course, any argument that
mitigation of culpability and punishment in this type of non-
provocation scenario is grounded in justification must necessarily
be quite confused.
2. Category 2: Misdirected Action due to Provocation
In the second category of cases, there is no question as to the ex-
istence of a real, substantial provocation causing the killer's heat of
passion. However, just as clear is that the provocation is not caused
by the victim, which is in direct opposition to the latter half of the
34. Id. at 887. The supreme court in Mauricio discussed the issue of intoxication in ref-
erence to whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant invocation of self-induced
intoxication as a defense under New Jersey law, and not in reference to heat of passion.
Nevertheless, having acknowledged that the defendant's intoxication at the time of the
killing was, at trial, undisputed, the supreme court concluded "that the evidence was suscep-
tible of different interpretations and that defendant's view of the case would have permitted
a jury rationally to conclude that a reasonable person might, under the circumstances, have
reasonably been provoked to the point of loss of control." Id. at 885.
35. For instance, and with specific reference to the "reasonableness" of interpreting
provocation, the court of appeals in Howell v. State repeatedly explicated that reasonableness
is inconsistent with intoxication: "[T]he existence of serious provocation must be deter-
mined through the eyes of a reasonable (and sober) person standing in the defendant's
shoes." Howell, 917 P.2d at 1207. The court's qualifying language, "(and sober)," is here
taken to mean that the reasonableness of one's determination of provocation is to be pre-
sumed unreasonable in the case that the determiner is intoxicated. Id.; see also Contreras,
2006 WML 2942524, at *22 (providing similar language). Lastly, the Alaska statute cited in
Howell, ALAsKA STAT. § 11.41.115(f)(2) (1988), reflects this exception to reasonableness:
"other than a person who is intoxicated ....
36. 568 A.2d at 887.
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provocation "criterion"-wrongful aggravation by the victim:7 In
such cases, with respect to the victim there exists no provocation
whatsoever.
a. Sub-Type: Unintentional Misdirection
Typically, a Category 2 case is one in which the killer is really and
substantially provoked, and the defendant undisputedly intends to
kill, but then accidentally kills a non-provoker Illustrative of this
case type is People v. Paredes,39 in which the defendant, after a dis-
pute with another man and in the heat of passion, fired several
bullets at his provoker as their respective cars traveled alongside
each other on the freeway. Paredes was successful in shooting and
killing his provoker, but he accidentally shot and killed a female
passenger in the provoker's car, as well. The trial court instructed
the jury on transferred intent and Paredes was convicted of two
counts of voluntary manslaughter.40 However, no issue as to provo-
cation on the female companion's part was ever raised.
In Paredes, transfer of intent is interpreted to mean that, because
the defendant's fury undermined his control and ability to form
malice aforethought, his wrongful killing of the non-provoking vic-
tim (i.e., the female companion) is non-murderous. In essence,
Paredes is convicted of the reduced crime of manslaughter because
he wrongfully killed the female companion while in a heat of pas-
sion state. Here, mitigation must be seen as an excuse as it cannot
be that the killing of the non-provoking victim was even slightly
justifiable.
b. Sub-Type: Knowing/Intentional Misdirection
The second subtype of Category 2 raises the issue as to whether
the heat of passion defense may be invoked in the case in which
the defendant has been seriously provoked and, in an emotionally
aroused state, knowingly or intentionally, kills a non-provoker. In
37. Note that because there remained a question as to whether the defendant in Mau-
ricio had been adequately provoked by anyone (including the bouncer), it is not included as a
Category 2 case.
38. See Dressier, Rethinking Heat of Passion, supra note 10, at 441 n.180.
39. No. B182323, 2007 WL 3015696 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2007).
40. On appeal, Paredes argued that this jury instruction was given in error and that he
should be found guilty only of involuntary manslaughter with respect to the provoker's
companion. The trial court's judgment was affirmed and both convictions were upheld. Id.
at *3-5.
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State v. Stewart,41 the defendant became enraged when his ex-
girlfriend (and mother of his toddler son) informed him that "she
was either HIV-positive or had AIDS." The defendant stabbed his
ex-girlfriend, who was pregnant by another man at the time, and
his son to death. The jury found Stewart guilty of heat of passion
manslaughter with respect to his ex-girlfriend and the unborn
child, but guilty of first- and second-degree murder of his son.
Note that Stewart was acquitted of first- and second-degree murder
of both his ex-girlfriend and the unborn child, though the unborn
child necessarily could not have provoked Stewart in any way. In
fact, it is not clear from the record as to whether Stewart even knew
that his ex-girlfriend was pregnant. So, with regard to the unborn
child, we have a case of adequate non-provocation similar to that in
Paredes-one of transfer of intent.
The conviction of first- and second-degree murder of Stewart's
son, though, presents a different issue, which makes Stewart a
unique case. Stewart testified that he did not remember killing his
son (presumably because of his heightened emotional arousal),
though he told police and his current girlfriend that he had first
put his hand over his son's mouth because he was afraid his son's
crying would attract attention.42 Stewart appealed the murder con-
viction but the judgment was affirmed.43 However, the Supreme
Court of Minnesota, in its unanimous decision, was explicit in not-
ing that its basis for upholding the conviction was not because
Stewart's son was a non-provoker, writing that "the victim and the
provocateur need not be the same person and that the mitigating
consequences of heat of passion, provoked by one party, may be
transferred to assaultive conduct toward someone other than the
provocateur., 44 Rather, the court affirmed the murder conviction
because Stewart's admissions to the police and his current girl-
friend demonstrated that he killed his son "in a rational,
calculating and controlled emotional state of mind-attempting to
avoid detection for the crime he just committed." 4' Implied in this
decision is that heat of passion may apply even when one kills a
non-provoker knowingly and intentionally. In this way, Stewart pro-
vides a meaning that is distinct from that of Paredes, and serves to
introduce a second subtype of Category 2 adequate non-
provocation.
41. 624 N.w.2d 585 (Minn. 2001).
42. Id. at 588.
43. Id. at 587.
44. Id. at 589-90.
45. Id. at 591.
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The court in Stewart referred not only to Minnesota statutory
law, but to the MPC 43 as well. The MPC provides that one who
would otherwise be guilty of murder is guilty only of the lesser of-
fense of manslaughter if the killing was "committed under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance [EMED] for
which there is reasonable explanation or excuse.,47 The MPC's ad-
aptation of heat of passion is carefully crafted to make sure that
there is little question that the defense is an excuse. The objective
standard of reasonableness of EMED is "subjectivized" or "deter-
mined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation
under the circumstances as he believes them to be." Also of note is
that there is no issue of adequate provocation; provocation need
not even exist, never mind cause the emotional disturbance, be
serious in degree, or meet any limitations applied in some com-
mon law jurisdictions (e.g., that the provocation need wrongfully
cause injury or be otherwise unlawful). Rather, the defendant need
only demonstrate a "reasonable explanation or excuse" for her
emotional disturbance. In the MPC, the mechanism by which
EMED excuses is in its diminishment of the actor's capacity to
function in a fully (or at least sufficiently) rational manner. In es-
sence, EMED reflects the limitation of diminished capacity that is
at the core of the excusing nature of heat of passion.
B. "Heat of Passion Law, "Not "Provocation Law"
Collectively, the Category 1 and 2 cases discussed above illustrate
a varied range of adequate non-provocation scenarios. Further-
more, by design, the MPC has removed the requirement of
adequate provocation and, via its EMED language, has emphasized
the need to examine the role that psychological dysfunction plays.
Therefore, to return briefly to my social cognitive argument, it ap-
pears that there is a broad foundation upon which to consider the
role of cognitive dysfunction (e.g., provocation interpretational
bias) in balance with the type of emotional interference that has
been central to the defense since its conception. That is, one who
is psychologically biased toward interpreting certain kinds of am-
biguous or "open" social situations as unjust and harmful may
become no less emotionally aroused, and therefore functionally
46. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (1980).
47. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (1980) (emphasis added). As Markus Dubber de-
clared in his characterization of the MPC's version of heat of passion: "Provocation carries
its excuseness on its sleeve .... DUBBER, supra note 4, at 265.
[VOL. 43:1
Adequate (Non)Provocation and Heat of Passion
limited, than do the types of heat of passion killers that have been
discussed thus far.
It should be noted, though, that whereas the absence of neither
actual provocation (Category 1) nor provocation by the victim
(Category 2) precludes a defendant from invoking the heat of pas-
sion defense and reducing a murder charge to manslaughter, the
absence of acting in the heat of passion certainly does. As inconsis-
tent as American courts have been about the nature and
application of the heat of passion defense, I am not aware of a sin-
gle court that has been so disturbed in its understanding of the
doctrine that it has allowed the provocation defense to be invoked
in a case in which, although the provocation may have been obvi-
ous, real, and substantially egregious, the defendant did not kill in
the heat of passion. The person who is provoked in the profound-
est of manners, but does not experience passion as a result, is
guilty of murder if she responds by intentionally killing another.
Certainly, the MPC's EMED language prevents one from reasona-
bly interpreting its version of heat of passion as a justification-
rather, the MPC plainly focuses on emotion and eliminates the
common law requisite of provocation altogether. Taken together,
adequate non-provocation case law, corresponding statutory law,
and the MPC serve to help us better glean what Dressler intended
when he stated that "[p]rovocation law is all about emotions."48
Though perhaps not all about emotion, what is clear is that provo-
cation law is primarily and largely about emotion. This realization
should provide some understanding as to how the non-traditional,
varied cases that are comprised by Categories 1 and 2 could have
evolved. In light of this focus on emotion, it may be argued that
the term heat of passion law is a decidedly more accurate one than is
provocation law.
III. ACTUAL PROVOCATION AND PROBLEMS WITH JUSTIFICATION
As stated at the beginning of this Article, the common law has
been inconsistent in its treatment of heat of passion as either a par-
tial justification versus excuse. The cases discussed in the previous
section highlight the varied applications of heat of passion as an
excuse. They do not by any means represent the entirety of U.S.
jurisdictions, and one could just as easily present cases in which
heat of passion is clearly treated as a justification, or a hybrid of
justification and excuse components. The fact that many courts
48. Dressier, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?, supra note 10, at 959 n.5.
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have understood heat of passion as a partial excuse, and have ap-
plied the doctrine across varied reactive-homicide scenarios, does
not in itself make the doctrine one of excuse (i.e., the doctrine's
nature exists independent of said cases). Just as clear, though, is
that if the doctrine were one ofjustification (or even one that com-
bines justification and excuse elements), it would necessarily mean
that these courts, the corresponding statutory law, and the MPC all
have heat of passion dead wrong, as heat of passion can only be
argued to be a partial justification, or have a justification compo-
nent, where there exists serious provocation (i.e., significant,
wrongful harm).
However, taken collectively, the adequate non-provocation cases
depict a broad scope within which common law heat of passion
must be understood as a partial excuse. Unless these cases are all
variations of the same mistake, they reflect a longstanding ration-
ale as to the excusatory nature of the doctrine. The rationale is
that if the doctrine may be conceptualized and applied as an ex-
cuse, then, even if it is represented and can be explained, at times,
as a justification, it cannot be the latter because the former "admits
to the existence of a social harm"49 and to the wrongfulness of the
act. In contrast, a justification is an assertion that the act is accept-
able and makes no such concession. In this way, excuse is a lower
moral standard than justification, and, as such, the defense cannot
be a justification (requiring it to always meet this higher moral
standard) if it can, at any time or in any instance, be rationalized
and viewed as an excuse~5 This understanding of distinction is not
specific to heat of passion, but applies across affirmative defenses.51
It could be argued that a successful claim that heat of passion is
indeed a partial excuse needs to demonstrate that in no way (or
case) can heat of passion be reasonably construed to be ajustifica-
tion. Using the same reasoning, though, this assertion is mistaken
because the moral standard of excuse lies below justification. How-
ever, this assertion does raise an important question: In what
scenario, if any, can heat of passion be argued to be a partial justi-
49. See Dressier, Rethinking Heat of Passion, supra note 10, at 438.
50. This argument responds equally well to a third position, which states that heat of
passion is sometimes an excuse and sometimes a justification. This "alternating" position is
far less prominent than either of the "exclusive" arguments. I speculate that this is, at least in
part, due to the realization by most theorists that because this issue is central to the nature
of the defense (as it is to all affirmative defenses) that to treat it alternately as ajustification
and excuse is the equivalent of acknowledging two distinct defenses that have simply been
assigned the same name.
51. For a recent example, Kyron Huigens made this same argument in retort to the
claim that duress is ajustification defense. Kyron Huigens, Duress Is Not ajustification, 2 OHiO
ST.J. CRIM. L. 303, 303-06 (2004).
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fication? One can only be said to become morally entitled to react
with violence in the case in which the victim first actually and in-
tentionally causes the killer a serious, wrongful harm. Of course,
acceptance of this characterization drastically limits the kind and
number of cases to which heat of passion applies. More impor-
tantly, even this narrowly tailored depiction of heat of passion fails
to sufficiently support the view that heat of passion is a justifica-
tion.
Scenarios that qualify according to this narrow depiction of ade-
quate provocation may be dichotomized into those in which a
reactive killing would not prevent further unjust harm and those in
which it would. If the reactive killing does not prevent further unjust
harm, then in no way could it be argued that heat of passion is a
partial justification. That is, the nature of the scenario does not
entitle one to act in what would be an otherwise unlawful manner
because no portion of the reactive killing may be said to prevent
further unjust harm from occurring. Certainly, one who wrongfully
provokes another may well deserve to be punished, but this does
not entitle the recipient of said provocation to unlawfully punish
(or engage in "retributive aggression" toward) him. Alternatively, if
he becomes so enraged or otherwise emotionally disturbed due to
said provocation, his reactive violence is, to some meaningful ex-
tent, understandable. It is because the reactive violence, though
wrongful, is understandable that the reactor is partially excused.
The understanding lies in the acknowledgment that, given the cir-
cumstances, a similarly placed individual would likely experience
emotional disturbance similar to that of the defendant's, and that
such an emotionally aroused state can undermine one's rationality
and limit one's self-control. 2 This is the essence of the rationale
underlying the adequate non-provocation cases, corresponding
statutory law, and MPC.
53
Let us consider reactive violence in the form of criminal battery,
by which a person intentionally inflicts harm or injury upon an-
other. If such a behavior is provoked, even egregiously, we do not
justify the behavior when it would not prevent further unjust harm.
However, this less serious form of reactive violence may be excused,
either partially or fully, in light of the circumstances in which it is
52. The notion that the emotional response need be "understandable" given the cir-
cumstances reflects an objective standard by which the killer's mental functioning is
assessed. This standard serves to distinguish wrongful killings for which there is some expli-
cable reason from those for which there is none.
53. With respect to the MPC, this sentiment is reflected by the language "extreme
mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse." MODEL
PENAL CODE § 210.3(1) (b) (1980) (emphasis added).
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enacted. How could it be, though, that a reactive killing committed
in the heat of passion is partially justified if a mere provoked bat-
tery that is enacted in a fit of rage is not? 4 The incompatibility of
this juxtaposition is immediately evident."
In the second instance in which the reactive homicide does pre-
vent further unjust harm by the provoker from occurring, one may
reasonably argue that the act is partially justified. For example,
perhaps the reactive homicide prevents the provoker from causing
further physical injury to a person (either the killer or another in-
dividual). In this case, a self-defense claim may fail because it is
unreasonable to interpret the provocation as one that is likely to be
imminently fatal (or at least to lead to grievous bodily harm). If so,
one could argue that, in this scenario, killing in the heat of passion
is partially justified. It would seem, though, that in the case in
which someone is facing further significant injury, but not death, a
more appropriate partial justification defense-if one is needed 5 --
54. It may be that, because of his wrongdoing (i.e., provocation), the provoker deserves
to be punished. One may argue that the reactive aggressor is entitled orjustified to retaliate.
However, whereas this argument may hold moral water, it fails with respect to legality. For
the punishment to be legal, it must be exacted according to due process of the laws. So,
even to the degree that heat of passion homicide may be morallyjustifiable, it remains com-
pletely legally unjustifiable but partially excusable. Framed another way, unless the provoker
poses the imminent threat of grievous bodily harm or death of another, he does not bestow
upon another the legal right to react with violence.
55. One might argue that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines approximate a solution
to this incompatibility; in its policy statement on victim's conduct, the Guidelines state: "If
the victim's wrongful conduct contributed significantly to provoking the offense behavior,
the court may reduce the sentence below the guideline range to reflect the nature and cir-
cumstances of the offense." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.10 (2008). This,
however, does not resolve the U.S. inconsistency. This is an accommodation via sentencing,
not verdict. As such, it is not a justification or excuse, but rather a factor that may mitigate
the defendant's sentence (and, in this way, has a potential effect that resembles that of an
affirmative defense, but only with respect to punishment). Carissa Byrne Hessick has argued
that the Guidelines here provide what is "essentially a provocation defense for all violent
crimes." Carissa Byrne Hessick, Violence Between Lovers, Strangers, and Friends, 85 WASH. U. L.
REv. 343, 381 n.148 (2007). However, I believe this is a dangerous equation, because, unlike
an affirmative defense (whether it be a justification or an excuse), sentencing guidelines
have no bearing on the determination of the defendant's guilt. Though the defendant who
benefits from the Sentencing Guidelines is subject to a shorter sentence, his verdict is no
different from that of the defendant who has committed the same crime and for whom this
mitigating sentencing policy does not apply.
56. Although self-defense and defense of others are typically all-or-nothing defenses,
and the partial defense of "self-defense with excessive force" is unpopular, there are various
scenarios that suggest that such a defense is proper. For example, one who has a reasonable
though erroneous belief that an attacker is about to kill him may use excessive force in kill-
ing the attacker to defend himself. If granted a partial defense (e.g., murder reduced to
manslaughter), it would be because his behavior is, in part, justified. If granted a full de-
fense (i.e., he receives no punishment), it would be because his behavior is, in part, justified
and, in part, excused. Of the two scenarios, the latter is more common, and often mistaken
as a full justification.
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is one in which a claim of self-defense with excessive force reduces
murder to manslaughter. In such a case, mitigation of culpability
and punishment may well be partially justified, though said mitiga-
tion is partially justified via self-defense or defense of others, and
not heat of passion.!s
Traditionally, United States common law does not recognize a
partial defense of self-defense with excessive force . Instead, emo-
tion is added to the equation, and the defendant who, in a state of
uncontrolled rage, kills his provoker in self-defense with excessive
force may invoke heat of passion. The added requirement of kill-
ing in a state of heated passion, though, transforms what may
otherwise be argued to be a partial justification into a partial ex-
cuse. That is, the emotional disturbance reduces one's ability to act
rightfully; or at least, it reduces his ability to refrain from acting
wrongfully.
In addition, in the case that heat of passion is treated as a partial
justification, there emerges a rather perverse implication. If it is
required that the killer need experience substantial emotional up-
set as a result of his reasonable belief of provocation, and that, but
for his emotional upset, he would not have lost self-control and
killed the provoker, the provocation-resistant person (or person
who maintains his control despite being seriously provoked) is
placed squarely at a disadvantage. For it is the provocation-resistant
person in this context who, though he has the reasonable belief
that he has been seriously provoked, and therefore is entitled to
some degree of retributive aggression, fails to meet the require-
ments of heat of passion and is convicted of murder. From a
justification perspective, this is problematic because it means that
the person who exhibits greater resolve (in that he maintains his
57. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stokes, 374 N.E.2d 87, 95 (Mass. 1978); Commonwealth
v. Kendrick, 218 N.E.2d 408, 414 (Mass. 1966) (reasoning that where excessive force is used
in response to the original assailant, the responding individual becomes the attacker, and,
"since death resulted from his use of excessive force, he would be guilty of manslaughter").
58. Although a fuller discussion is outside the scope of this Article, the doctrine of self-
defense (and defense of others) is in need of similar analysis and reformation. In the case
that a defendant charged with murder reasonably (self-defense) or unreasonably but genu-
inely (imperfect self-defense) makes the erroneous judgment that he is faced with an
imminently fatal threat (or threat that is about to cause him grievous bodily harm), he can-
not be said to be justified in his response. If the threat does not exist, then the perceived
aggravator cannot be said to deserve, even partially, to be killed, and the defendant cannot
be said to be entitled to his homicidal act. In fact, the defendant cannot be said to be de-
fending himself at all. Indeed, I have attended to this matter elsewhere. See Reid Griffith
Fontaine, An Attack on Self-Defense, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/so3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1275858.
59. Cynthia K. Y. Lee, The Act-Belief Distinction in Self-Defense Doctrine: A New Dual Re-
quirement Theory ofJustification, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 191,203 (1998).
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rational self) is punished more severely, although, everything else
being equal, he was wronged by the provoker every bit as much,
and therefore was just as entitled to retaliate. From an excuse per-
spective, it makes good sense because the provocation-resistant
person is controlled and rational when he kills the provoker, and,
as a result, should not be partially excused.
Finally, the difference in moral meaning between the two serious
provocation scenarios (i.e., one in which the harm caused by the
provoker is complete prior to the retaliatory killing, and one in
which the killing prevents the provoker from causing additional
harm) is further reflected by their respective underlying motives.
In the first scenario, the presumed motive is one conceived in an-
ger in which the killer aims to harm the provoker. In the second
scenario, the presumed motive is to defend oneself or another.
Motive is normally not specified as an element of any level of
criminal homicide. 6 However, the meaning of motive in homicide
law is critical as a motive's content may often be used to infer how
guilty the mind of the actor is. One may impute moral status to a
reactive killer when considering an affirmative defense (such as
heat of passion or excessive force in self-defense) in the same
manner. In the first scenario, the defendant need show emotional
dysfunction to excuse his angry retaliation. Given the circum-
stances, his reaction, though wrongful, may be understandable and
therefore partially excusable. In the second scenario, the defen-
dant need show no emotional arousal as the justifying nature of his
motive (to defend himself or another and prevent further wrong-
ful harm) makes moot questions of emotional disturbance and
rational capacity. His action is justifiable to the degree that he
acted as he should have (or, at least, was entitled to have) acted.
IV. JUSTIFIABLE EMOTIONS Do NOT MAKE JUSTIFIABLE BEHAVIORS
In cases in which a defense of oneself or another is dispropor-
tionately excessive in force and the defendant is found guilty of
manslaughter, there is no need to demonstrate a certain level of
emotion or lack of self-control. 6' Likewise, there is no requirement
to negate mens rea. These defenses presume that the actor is ra-
tional at the time that she kills, whereas demonstrating emotional
dysfunction and loss of self-control are central to heat of passion.
60. Cf Carissa Byrne Hessick, Motive's Role in Criminal Punishment, 80 S. CAL. I. REV.
89, 99-100 (2006).
61. For if there were, the defense would be, in essence, a variation of heat of passion.
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From a retributive perspective-and make no mistake, heat of pas-
sion is founded upon retributive doctrine 62 -it is unclear as to why
(or how) emotional disturbance or loss of self-control would ever
be recognized, let alone required, by a partial justification defense.
If the provocation is such that it partially justifies the reactive kill-
ing-in that it will lead to even greater unjust harm if not
stopped-why would emotion be considered at all?
63
This question goes to the issue of discerning individual psycho-
logical elements that the heat of passion doctrine specifically
recognizes. 6 First, cognition is identified in the form of interpreting
the social stimulus that is presented. One must discern the mean-
ing of the situation at hand: Is someone else acting unjustly toward
me? If so, is she doing it with the intention to harm me? If so, how
serious is the harm (or potential harm)? The heat of passion kil-
ler's ability to make meaning of the social stimulus is directly
relevant to the requirement of adequate provocation. As empha-
sized throughout this Article, emotion is central to heat of passion.
The killer must have experienced such intense emotional arousal
that her self-control is undermined. Finally, the killer's behavior is
ultimately what forces the question of whether she acted in the
heat of passion. That is, if she did not kill another, the issue as to
whether she may invoke the defense is moot.
I believe that these three forms of human functioning are often
confused in the consideration of the nature of heat of passion.
62. As with all affirmative defenses, heat of passion is based on desert. It is not because
a reduced sentence serves some utilitarian goal, but because the heat of passion killer is less
deserving of punishment than is the murderer because the former killed out of a rationally-
undermined, emotionally-charged state.
63. Indeed, in England, the Law Commission Report No. 304, LAW COMMISSION, RE-
PORT No. 304, MURDER, MANSLAUGHTER, AND INFANTICIDE 5.17 (2006), has specifically
recommended eliminating the common law requirement of "loss of self-control" from the
provocation defense. Abandonment of this requirement may be viewed as a step closer
(though by itself insufficient) to reforming the provocation defense into a partial justifica-
tion; likewise, it may also be viewed as overhauling the provocation defense so critically that
it could no longer be termed heat of passion.
64. The mediational sequence described in this section is consistent with both ap-
praisal theory and social-information processing theory in psychological science. See, e.g.,
Nicki R. Crick & Kenneth A. Dodge, A Review and Reformulation of Social Information-Processing
Mechanisms in Children's Social Adjustment, 115 PsYcHoL. BULL. 74 (1994); Richard S. Lazarus
& Craig A. Smith, Knowledge and Appraisal in the Cognition-Emotion Relationship, 2 COGNITION
& EMOTION 281 (1988). It is also consistent with the evaluative (as opposed to mechanistic)
conception of emotion favored by Professors Dan Kahan and Martha Nussbaum in their
influential work that distinguished alternative conceptions of emotion in the law. Dan M.
Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L.
REv. 269 (1996). The common assertion of these perspectives is that emotion is a product of
cognitive appraisal (i.e., the assignment of understanding and meaning to a stimulus, event,
or situation; an example is the interpretation that a stimulus actor intends to do harm and
poses a threat of danger, which may, in turn, evoke emotions such as anger and fear).
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Heat of passion reflects a mediated path by which there is an
interpretation of provocation (cognition) that causes overwhelm-
ing anger (emotion), which, in turn, leads to a reactive killing
(behavior). It is this mediated path that was so clearly articulated in
the majority opinion in Yanz.k" It is perhaps, in part, due to this
clear delineation that Yanz continues to be cited more than a hun-
dred years later.
Whereas Yanz provides a straightforward demarcation of the
roles of cognition and emotion in heat of passion, some confusion
about the nature of the defense likely stems from the blurring of
emotion and behavior. Because emotion and behavior are typically
closely related in reactive killings (i.e., a provoked killer is likely an
angry or fearful one), their relatedness may be misunderstood as
sameness and thus contribute to why the courts' inconsistent
treatment of heat of passion as a partial justification versus excuse
(or both) is so longstanding.' Although it may well be the case that
a killer's emotional outrage at having been provoked is accepted as
justified, reactive violence is another matter altogether. The killer
could be entitled to be angry, but this entitlement does not extend
to a violent retaliation. In fact, the degree to which one's emotions
or feelings are justifiable have no bearing on the justifiability of the
behavior which said emotions may inspire. Rather, the justifiability
of an act depends on the balancing of the good and bad the act
causes and the good and bad it prevents. This determination is
completely independent of the act's emotional content, though
such content may reflect the actor's subjective understanding of
the act's moral status. In this way, justifiable emotions do not (and
cannot) make otherwise wrongful behaviors justifiable.
It is not difficult to confuse the justifiability of emotion and be-
havior in heat of passion. Doing so, of course, has the obvious
potential for creating an illusion that the doctrine is naturallyjusti-
ficatory. Surely, many, if not most, successful heat of passion cases
involve a killer whose emotional outrage, though not homicidal
behavior, appears to be at least somewhat warranted. It may be that
the ease with which we identify with the outrage leads us, at times,
to view the reactive killing as partially justified. 7 In the case of a
65. The key language from Yanz is quoted earlier in this Article. See supra note 26 and
accompanying text.
66. See Fontaine, supra note 14, at 147 n.6.
67. This confusion between a moral judgment (or idea) and moral "feeling" is reflec-
tive of David Hume's ill-conceived notion that "[miorality ... is more properly felt than
judg'd of; tho' this feeling or sentiment is commonly so soft and gentle, that we are apt to
confound it with an idea." See DAVID HUIME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE bk. 111, pt. 1,
§ ii., at 470 (L. A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press 1965) (1888). Of course, psy-
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particularly egregious provocation (e.g., violent sexual abuse of
one's child by a neighbor), it may even be that we feel good to
learn that the provoker was killed; we may think he got what was com-
ing to him, and he will not be able to commit such a heinous act again.
Whereas the law does not regulate how we think (the provoker de-
serves to die) and feel (happiness and relief that the provoker has
been killed), it does indeed regulate how we act. The distinction is
that, because thinking and feeling do not in and of themselves
cause harm to others, one should be free to think and feel as one
likes, but the same, of course, cannot be said of behavior.
Still, although emotional outrage cannot in and of itself justify
the behavior it inspires, it may provide valuable information for
assessing the wrongfulness of the behavior in question. It is our
understanding of a person's emotional upset that gives rise to our
inclination to consider this information in determining the ex-
cusability of the wrongful behavior. Such emotional upset may arise
in a variety of scenarios, though it emerges from a genuine belief
of having been subjected to an abuse or otherwise unjust treat-
ment.
CONCLUSION
In the case of a defendant who has been charged with murder,
he may invoke the heat of passion defense in an affirmative at-
tempt to receive the lesser crime of manslaughter. Typically, the
defendant is required to show that he was adequately provoked
and, as a direct result of the provocation, became so emotionally
aroused that he lost self-control and killed his provoker. It is not
the provocation that mitigates the defendant's culpability and pun-
ishment, but the emotionally-charged effect that it has on him.
Even in the case of the most egregious provocation imaginable,
provocation does not reduce murder to manslaughter if it does not
create for the killer emotional disturbance that undermines his
rationality and self-control. In such a case, the defendant is guilty
of the more serious crime of murder.
For a number of reasons, including the complicated psychologi-
cal nature of reactive homicide, the heat of passion defense has
remained subject to various points of confusion. One persistent
chology has long demonstrated that Hume had it quite wrong. One has a feeling about
morality because he has had an idea (or has made a judgment) about morality; that is, the
feeling results from, and is a reflection of, the idea (the cognitive representation and mean-
ing that he has ascribed to the perceived scenario). Lazarus & Smith, supra note 64, at 282-
86.
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issue of disagreement has been the justificatory versus excusatory
nature of the defense. This Article attempts to highlight and cate-
gorize a series of varied American cases in which the applicability
of heat of passion was extended to instances of reactive homicide
although adequate provocation (or significant provocation by the
victim) was absent. The cases are organized to illustrate that even
in circumstances in which there is no actual provocation, or the
provocation is not sourced to the victim, the heat of passion de-
fense may still be raised. The rationale underlying these non-
traditional cases is that the emotional disturbance that interferes
with one's rationality and self-control arises as an effect of the
genuine belief that one has been seriously wronged. The range of
adequate non-provocation is interpreted to suggest that culpability
that is characteristic of a yet additional scenario-in which the
homicide is a function of both cognitive and emotional dysfunc-
tion-may be covered by the defense.
In addition, I have outlined new arguments for the excusatory
nature of heat of passion, demonstrating how the defense fails as a
partial justification even in most situations in which the killer has
been seriously provoked by the victim. Finally, scholarly and judi-
cial blurring of the discrete psychological components of heat of
passion homicide may contribute to the longstanding confusion as
to the nature of the defense. In sum, this Article contributes fur-
ther evidence as to why it is correct to view heat of passion as a
partial excuse.
Although the respective roles of cognition, emotion, and con-
duct in heat of passion are related in such a unique manner that
nowhere else in criminal law are they similarly treated, some ar-
guments presented herein have implications that extend beyond
this specific doctrine. For example, distinguishing alternative types
of individual functioning (e.g., cognition versus emotion) in duress
may prove useful to clarifying the nature (i.e., justification or ex-
cuse) of the doctrine. In addition, the doctrines of self-defense and
defense of others are not beyond debate as to their nature.68 If a
killer reasonably but erroneously believes that someone was about
to kill him, is his killing justified? If not, is it excusable? If it is only
excusable, is self-defense an excuse? Or does the nonjustifiable
nature of this scenario have no bearing on the nature of self-
defense because it does not, by definition, reflect an act by which
one defended himself? This line of questioning suggests that the
framing of these doctrines may need to be reconsidered, in much
68. See Fontaine, supra note 58.
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the same way that the social cognitive argument reviewed above
places the common law framing of heat of passion into question.
Whether a defense is a justification or excuse, and how the law
comes to some determination of the nature of a defense, may
seem, at first glance, to be relatively unimportant concerns. For
instance, one who is fully excused (as in the case of insanity) goes
entirely unpunished, identical to the defendant whose actions are
fully justified (as in the case of self-defense). Indeed, a proper dis-
cussion of why these topics are attributed considerable import has
been provided elsewhere. 9 Perhaps most basic, as well as impor-
tant, though, is that properly distinguishing justification from
excuse is critical because it lies at the heart of what separates right
from wrong, and, in this way, is natural to the very foundation
upon which criminal law stands.
69. See, e.g., 1 PAUL ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES §§ 31-39 (1984); Dressier, Re-
thinkingHeat of Passion, supra note 10, at 444-50; Reid Griffith Fontaine, On Passion's Potential
to Undennine Rationality: A Reply, 43 U. MicH.J.L. REFORM 207 (2009).
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